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Abstract We introduce human traders into an agent based financial market
simulation prone to bubbles and crashes. We find that human traders earn lower prof-
its overall than do the simulated agents (“robots”) but earn higher profits in the most
crash-intensive periods. Inexperienced human traders tend to destabilize the smaller
(10 trader) markets, but have little impact on bubbles and crashes in larger (30 trader)
markets and when they are more experienced. Humans’ buying and selling choices
respond to the payoff gradient in a manner similar to the robot algorithm. Similarly,
following losses, humans’ choices shift towards faster selling.
Keywords Financial markets · Agent-based models · Experimental economics
1 Introduction
We insert human traders into an agent-based simulation model of a financial market
that is susceptible to bubbles and crashes. The results illuminate both the simulation
model and the market behavior of humans.
Bubbles and crashes have received a lot of attention recently, but as yet have no
widely accepted theoretical explanation. Several agent-based models have been pro-
posed. A leading example is Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), who find bubble
and crash dynamics in simulations when the majority of agents switch from a
fundamentalist strategy to a trend-following strategy. A more recent example is the
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Friedman and Abraham (2009) model of agents who adjust their leverage in response
to a payoff gradient. Bubbles and crashes arise from an endogenous market risk pre-
mium that responds to investors’ recent losses.
In his Handbook of Computational Economics survey, Duffy (2006) notes that
agent-based simulation models are commonly calibrated to aggregate field data,1
e.g., to the mean and variance of weekly returns in the S&P 500 index 1970–2007, but
that it is much more difficult to assess the external validity of the model’s assumed
individual agent behavior using field data. For example, how do individual agents
respond when others deleverage rapidly as in 2008–2009? Duffy points out that labo-
ratory experiments with human subjects often provide the best available evidence on
such adjustment parameters, and thus can illuminate simulation models. Indeed, one
of the very first economic experiments sought to calibrate oligopoly simulations. Key
parameters for individual reaction functions were difficult to infer from existing field
data, so Hoggatt (1959) ran oligopoly markets using networked teletype terminals for
humans together with simulated agents that he dubbed “robots.” Garman (1976), in
an influential early study of financial market microstructure, had similar motivations
and technique.
Duffy’s survey notes that, conversely, simulation models can illuminate the behav-
ior observed in laboratory and field markets. In particular, Gode and Sunder (1993)
used “zero-intelligence” robots in simulations that help explain the rapid convergence
to competitive equilibrium seen in laboratory markets with human traders. Carl Plat
(1995) inserted robot liquidity traders into an laboratory financial market. In order
to better understand the markets’ stability and convergence properties, Cason and
Friedman (1997) , among others, used robots following equilibrium strategies to train
human subjects.
The present paper combines both traditions. Section 2 summarizes the Friedman
and Abraham (2009) simulation model, Sect. 3 describes its implementation as a
laboratory experiment with human subjects, and Sect. 4 presents the results. The sim-
ulation model is robust in the sense that human traders have little impact on bubbles
and crashes in larger (30 trader) markets and when they are more experienced. Human
trading prowess is demonstrated by the fact that, although human traders earn lower
profits overall than do the robots, they earn higher profits in the most crash-inten-
sive periods. Validating the trading algorithm of the simulation model, we find that
humans’ buying and selling choices respond strongly to the payoff gradient. Also as
assumed by the algorithm, humans respond to their own losses (and, to a lesser extent,
to market wide losses) by selling.
Concluding remarks are collected in Sect. 5. Appendix A gathers details about
implementations and presents supplementary data analysis. Appendix B is a copy of
the instructions to laboratory subjects.
1 Several agent-based financial market models recently have been successfully estimated on aggregate
financial market data, e.g.,Alfarano et al. (2005).
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2 A Model of Bubbles and Crashes
Friedman and Abraham (2009) construct a model of portfolio managers who buy and
sell a single riskless (“safe”) asset with constant return Ro and a single risky asset
with variable return R1. Each portfolio manager chooses a single ordered variable
u ∈ [0,∞) that represents the allocation to the risky asset. Choices u > 1 represent
leverage, in which the safe asset is borrowed to purchase more of the risky asset. The
manager’s net portfolio value is denoted by the variable z.
The price of the risky asset turns out to be
P = V u¯d , (1)
where V is fundamental value, i.e., the present value of future dividends, while u¯ is the
z-weighted mean allocation across all portfolio managers, and d is a parameter that
captures the sensitivity of price to buying pressure. Friedman and Abraham (2009)
show that realized yield on the risky asset then is
R1 = (Rs − gs)u¯−d + gs + d ˙¯u/u¯. (2)
where Rs ≥ Ro is the discount rate and gs < Rs is the growth rate. The first term rep-
resents the dividend yield, the second term represents capital gains due to underlying
growth, and the third term represents short term capital gains (or losses) due to buying
(or selling) pressure.
The payoff function of manager i is
φ = Ri (ui ) = (R1 + αi − Ro)ui − 12 c2u
2
i , (3)
where the idiosyncratic excess return αi is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic pro-
cess, i.e., mean reverting to zero in continuous time. The market-wide price of risk
c2 is determined endogenously, as follows. Denote manager i’s current loss by Li =
max{0,−RGi }, where the gross return RGi ignores the risk premium (or sets c2 = 0)
in Eq. (3). Let Lˆi (t) denote the exponential average of Li (see Appendix A for details),
and let LˆT (t) denote the zi−weighted average of the Lˆi ’s. Then c2 is proportional to
these market-wide perceived losses,
c2 = β LˆT (t), (4)
where the parameter β > 0 reflects investors’ sensitivity to perceived loss.
The key behavioral assumption is that the managers adjust their exposure to risk
by following the payoff gradient,
φu = R1 + αi − Ro − c2u. (5)
In continuous time, the adjustment equation for manager i is u˙i = φui . That is, each
manager continuously adjusts her risk position in proportion to her payoff slope. If
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Fig. 1 Basic user interface
φu is positive (or negative) for a manager, she adds to (or sells off part of) her risky
asset position, and does so more rapidly the steeper the payoff function at her current
position. As explained in Friedman and Abraham (2009), quadratic transaction costs
make it optimal to follow the gradient, and not to jump immediately to the current
maximum of the payoff function. Note that the gradient differs across managers due to
the αi term in (5). Note also that the gradient depends on the current strategy choices
and adjustments of all managers via the u¯ and ˙¯u terms in (2).
For a wide range of parameter configurations, Friedman and Abraham (2009) obtain
occasional bubbles and crashes. When losses have been small for a long time, the risk
premium shrinks and asset prices rise as fund managers increase leverage. Then slight
losses can trigger a crash, as a wider risk premium causes deleveraging, asset price
declines, further losses and a still wider risk premium.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at University of California, Santa Cruz’s Learning and
Experiment Economic Projects (LEEPS) lab, using the Hubnet feature of NetLogo.
NetLogo is a cross-platform multi-agent programmable modeling environment, and
the HubNet feature enables human participation.2 In our experiment, each human sub-
ject controlled a portfolio manager (called simply a “trader” in the instructions and
below) using a screen display similar to one shown in Fig. 1.
2 To learn more about NetLogo see http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/.
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A typical session lasted 90 min and involved 5 inexperienced human subjects
recruited by email from a campus-wide pool of undergraduate volunteers. Subjects
silently read the instructions attached in Appendix B and then listened to an oral
summary by the experiment conductor. After a couple of practice periods, subjects
participated in about 12 periods. Then they were paid in US dollars according to the
wealth achieved at the end of each trading period, typically receiving between $15
and $25.
In each trading period, each human subject can buy and sell the risky asset. His or
her incentive is to maximize wealth by buying units (“shares”) when cheap and selling
them when the the price is high. Subjects are not told the pricing Eq. 1 nor the values
of V, u¯, and d. However, as shown in Fig. 1, they see the current price P and a graph
of the price since the period started. The instructions say that price is determined by
the growth rate and the interest rate, and by buying and selling pressure, and we write
on the board that the growth rate is zero and the interest rate is three percent. We
tell subjects that no single trader has much influence on P , but collectively their net
buying pressure increases the price and net selling pressure decreases the price.
Each trading period consists of 20 “years,” and the subjects’ screens update on a
“weekly” basis, as shown in Fig. 1. Before the trading period begins, each human sub-
ject is endowed with 500 “lab dollars” and 70 shares of stock. Current wealth is equal to
the agent’s riskless asset holdings (“cash”), plus the number of shares owned times the
current stock price. Wealth updates weekly due to price changes as well from interest
earned on cash holdings or interest paid on net borrowing; leveraged buying is allowed
up to a limit proportional to current wealth. Of course, buying shares decreases the cash
position by the amount purchased times the stock price plus a transaction cost. Selling
shares increases cash holdings by the proceeds minus a transaction cost. If a human
goes bankrupt, i.e., his wealth falls to zero, then he is immediately barred from further
trading that period and has a final wealth of −500 Lab Dollars for the period. All human
subjects are equally re-endowed and are allowed to resume trading in the next period.
Figure 1 shows the basic interface for human subjects. Besides asset price, the dis-
play includes the components of wealth just mentioned. Near the bottom of the screen
are seven buttons for buying and selling. Clicking the button labeled −3 sells shares
at a rapid rate each week (until another button is clicked or share holdings reach zero),
−2 sells shares at a moderate rate, and −1 at rather slow rate. Similarly, by clicking
the button 3 (or 2 or 1) the trader purchases shares each week at a rapid (or moderate
or slow) rate, and she ceases to buy or sell by clicking button 0.
In more detail, a human trader i’s current wealth is zi = xi + Pyi , where P is the
current asset price and xi ∈ (−∞,∞) and yi ≥ 0 denote current cash position and
share holdings. His risk position then is ui = 1−(xi/zi ). Choosing the slow, moderate
or rapid rate (±1, 2 or 3) for buying or selling corresponds to a weekly change in u of
0.125, 0.25 or 0.5 respectively. The corresponding transaction costs are quadratic, and
so are equal to square of the weekly change times a constant c. Standard adjustment
costs use c = 1, where a fast rate incurs a transaction cost of 0.52 = 25% of the market
value of the transaction, a moderate rate incurs a transaction cost of 0.252 = 6.25%,
and a slow rate incurs a cost of only 0.1252 = 1.6%.
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3.1 Simulation Specifications
Robots are distinct from humans in that robots are programmed to react to the payoff
gradient which includes the risk cost term based on market-wide losses. Humans may
or may not behave similarly.
The integration of human and robot traders into a single market proceeds as follows.
Each week the the NetLogo algorithm first updates each robot’s allocation ui based
on i’s payoff gradient as defined in Eq. 5. At the same time, each human trader adjusts
his or her allocation u j by changing or staying with one of the seven adjustment rates.
Second, the algorithm computes the new values of u¯ and ˙¯u by averaging across the
new values of ui and u j weighted by portfolio size. Third, applying Eqs. 1–2 to these
new values, the algorithm updates asset price and return (and portfolio size). Next the
algorithm computes losses and updates the parameter c2. After a random increment to
the the idiosyncratic shock, the algorithm then updates each robot’s payoff gradient
for the next week. More details can be found in Appendix A. Full documentation,
source code and executable code can be found at http://www.vismath.org/research/
landscapedyn/models/markets/.
Simulations are governed by a parameter vector specifying the discount rate, idio-
syncratic shock volatility and so forth, as detailed in Friedman and Abraham (2009).
The experiment uses the baseline parameter vector of that paper, except that volatility
is increased from σ = 0.2 to 0.3 to make humans less able to predict price movements.
The parameter vector thus is Ro = 0.03, Rs = 0.06, g = 0.0, σ = 0.3, τ = 0.7, η =
0.7, β = 2, d = 2, λ = 1, d = 1, and rate = 1.3; see Appendix A for all parameter
definitions.
3.2 Treatments
We employ three treatment variables, as follows.
• Number of human and robot traders, NT. We examine five levels of NT: (0 humans,
30 robots), (1 human, 29 robots), (5 humans, 25 robots), and (5 humans, 5 robots)
(0 humans, 10 robots). The first and last levels are run separately as controls. The
other three levels are run as blocks in each session. The sessions all have four
blocks of three (1040 week) periods, and the treatments are rotated across blocks
with the first and last block the same. The level of NT is publicly announced at the
beginning of each block.
• Graphical Interface, IF. In some sessions, human subjects have only the basic user
interface described earlier. In other sessions they have the enhanced interface shown
in Fig. 2, which also shows the distribution (“Density Chart”) of other traders’ risk
positions, and a graph of the payoff function (the “Landscape”). The enhanced
interface also includes a NetLogo graphics window that displays the positions (ui ,
on the horizontal axis) and portfolio sizes (zi , on the vertical axis) of each trader,
with robots plotted as as small triangles and human traders as round dots. The sub-
ject’s own current position and and wealth is indicated by a dot of a different color.
• Transaction Costs, TC. In some sessions, humans incur the standard transaction
costs described earlier (c = 1.0), while in other sessions they incur low transaction
costs (c = 0.5), half as large as standard.
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Fig. 2 Enhanced user interface with graphics window, landscape, and density chart
3.3 Sessions
We have collected data in 9 sessions, configured as follows.
• Sessions 1, 2 and 3 use only the basic interface (IF = B) and standard transac-
tion costs (c = 1.0). The NT rotation in session 1 is (1 human and 29 robots)
in the first block, (5 human, 5 robots) in the second block, (5 human and 25
robots) in the third block, and finally (1 human, 29 robots) again in the last
block. In session 2, the rotation is (5 human, 5 robots), (5 human and 25 robots),
(1 human and 29 robots), and (5 human, 5 robots). In session 3 it is (5 human and
25 robots), (1 human and 29 robots), (5 human, 5 robots), and (5 human and 25
robots).
• Sessions 4, 5, and 6 are the same as 1, 2 and 3 except that they use the enhanced
interface (IF = E).
• Sessions 7, 8, and 9 are the same as 1, 2 and 3 except that they use the enhanced
interface (IF = E) and low transaction costs (c = 0.5).
4 Results
Figure 3 shows a prime example of a bubble and crash. The fundamental value V ,
given the baseline parameters, is 1Rs−gs = 1.06−0 ≈ 17, but in this period the price
rises well above that by week 300 and stays high (with substantial fluctuations) until
about week 800 when it crashes down to about 8 where it remains (again with fluctu-
ations) for the rest of the 1,040 week period. One sees many such episodes in other
periods, albeit often less dramatic.
There is no universally accepted definition of a crash so, somewhat arbitrarily, the
analysis to follow defines it as a decline in price P of at least 50% from its highest
point within the previous 26 weeks.
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Fig. 3 Asset price in period 7 of session 7
The rest of this section presents answers to five empirical questions: whether humans
change the distribution of crashes, outperform robots, herd, follow a payoff gradient
and react to exponential average of their own and market wide losses.
4.1 Do Humans Provoke Crashes?
We compare the frequency of crashes in periods with human traders to those with
robots only. Figure 4 shows that periods with humans seem to have the same crash
distribution as those with no humans in the treatments with 30 traders. However, in
treatments with 10 traders, crashes seem more frequent with human traders. Table 1
confirms this impression using the Kolmogrov–Smirnov test.
Is there any time trend? As detailed in the Appendix, we find that the crash fre-
quency declines consistently and significantly over time in the (5 humans, 5 robots)
Fig. 4 Distribution of crashes by population
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Table 1 Kolmogrov–Smirnov test
Treatments Nobs D p value
1 Human, 29 robots vs. 30 robot 180 0.06 0.50
5 Human, 25 robots vs. 30 robots 36 0.25 0.15
5 Humans, 5 robots vs. 10 robots 36 0.50 0.00
Nobs report the number of observations in each empirical distribution function, D is the maximum differ-
ence between the two cumulative distribution functions, and p value reports the significance of the standard
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
treatment with standard transaction costs, but we find no time trend in the other
treatments.
4.2 Can Humans Beat Robots?
Figure 5 displays the average end-of-period wealth for human subjects and for the
robots used in the experiment. As detailed in Appendix A, the figure adjusts robots’
wealth to make it comparable to humans’, by removing the random component from
initial endowment and by imposing transaction costs. The figure also shows final
wealth for the passive no-trade (i.e., buy-and-hold) strategy, given the closing asset
prices seen in the experiment. Evidently, gradient adjustment robots outperform both
humans and the passive strategy in all three environments, and standard t-tests confirm
Fig. 5 Wealth comparison
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Fig. 6 Wealth comparison during high crash periods
that the differences are significant. The t tests also confirm that humans do signifi-
cantly better than the passive strategy in the environment with low transaction costs
and an enhanced user interface, but show that the differences are insignificant in the
other two environments.
Figure 6 shows that human traders have a comparative advantage in crash periods,
that is, in the (5 humans, 5 robots) treatment. The advantage is statistically significant
in the standard transaction cost treatments with both basic and enhanced interface.
Why do humans do better in crises? Perhaps they can look further down the road,
and pursue contrarian strategies. To investigate, we now take a closer look at how
humans choose their actions.
4.3 Choosing Adjustment Rates
Figure 7 shows the overall distributions of adjustment rates.
About half the time, human traders remain at adjustment rate 0 and so are inactive.
The figure shows clearly that human traders are sensitive to market frictions. They
use the slower adjustment rates more often that the moderate rates, and rarely use the
fastest rates except when transaction costs are low.
The last panel of the figure sorts robots’ continuous gradient adjustment choices
according to the closest of the seven choices given to humans. (For example, if a robot
chose a gradient of 0.1 then that choice would be coded as a slow buy, 0.125, since
it is between 0.0625 and 0.1875.) The result is also a unimodal distribution around 0,
but closer to the uniform distribution.
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Fig. 7 Frequency of adjustment-rates
Figures 8 and 9 address the question of why humans outperform robots in high
crash periods.
We take a closer look at the 5 human, 5 robot data to examine the humans’ adjust-
ment rates in the 52 “weeks” prior to the onset of a crash (“Anticipation”), and the
weeks for which price is less than half its maximum over the preceding 26 weeks
(“Crash”). Figure 8 shows that humans tend to sell in anticipation of a crash and tend
to buy at the end of a crash while robots tend toward extremes at the end of a crash.
Behavior in other periods resembles that shown in Fig. 7. We also compare adjust-
ment rates of the humans who earn above the average final wealth to humans who earn
below average final wealth. Figure 9 shows that the higher earners sell more before
the crash and buy more after the crash.
4.4 Herding?
Do human traders influence each others’ allocation decisions? The graphics window
in the enhanced user interface allows them to see the current leverage position of
all traders (robot and human), and Figs. 10 and 11 suggests that this interface may
encourage humans to herd together. These figures show typical snapshots taken half
way through a trading period, and the human traders (indicated by the colored circles)
are much more tightly bunched (at very low values of u) in the Enhanced Interface
panel. The dispersion of robots (indicated as red triangles) seems about the same in
both panels, as one might expect.
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Fig. 8 Humans vs. robot during anticipation and end of crash period
Fig. 9 High vs. low human earner groups
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Fig. 10 Basic interface treatment (BT, humans cannot see others). Snapshot taken at week 520 from session
5 period 6
Fig. 11 Enhanced interface treatment (ET, humans cannot see others). Snapshot taken at week 520 session
9 period 3
Figure 12 examines the question quantitatively. It shows that the average correlation
coefficient between human adjustment rates are very similar in the relevant population
30 treatments, even in periods with crashes. However, in the population 10 treatments,
crashes are more frequent, and here correlation coefficients are much higher, espe-
cially in crash periods. Standard one-sided t tests confirm that the differences are
insignificant for the entire period (t = 0.70) and for the Crash weeks (t = 1.11) in
the population 30 treatments, but are quite significant in the population 10 treatments
(t = 2.89). One possible interpretation is that in the more stressful environments,
humans learn from each other to be contrarians.
4.5 Do Humans Follow the Gradient?
We are now prepared to investigate one of the primary questions that motivated the
experiment: are gradient-following robots at all like human traders? Perhaps the most
direct test is to regress human traders’ adjustment choices ah on the gradient evaluated
at the trader’s current allocation uh . We specify
ah = β0 + β1 ∗ ˜φuh + e, (6)
where ˜φuh for human traders is given by (5) truncated to lie between ± 0.50. The
truncation reflects humans’ bounded choice set. Of course, for human traders, α in (5)
is set to zero.
A β1 estimate near 1.0 indicates gradient adjustment, but of course, the discrete
nature of humans’ adjustment choice precludes attaining that value. To find a more
appropriate benchmark value, Table 2 reports regression results for robot data, where
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Fig. 12 Correlation of adjustment-rates
Table 2 Gradient adjustment estimates by population treatment
Sample 1 Human, 29 Robots 5 Humans, 25 Robots 5 Humans, 5 Robots
Human 0.82∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Human nobs 185,132 185,667 181,285
Robots 0.99∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.64∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nobs 5,418,360 934,200 186,840
Random effects slope coefficient estimates (and standard errors) from Eq. 6. ∗∗ Significant at 1%
Variables are as in Table 3
the dependent variable is the sorted gradient choice reported in the last panel of Fig. 7.
The Table 2 shows that humans are not exactly following a gradient but are surprisingly
close; in each case the estimated coefficient for humans is more than half as large as
robots’.
4.6 Do Humans React to Recent Losses?
A second motivating question concerns the endogenous risk premium: do humans
respond to an exponential average of their own losses Lˆ , and/or to an exponential
average of market wide losses, c2?
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Table 3 Random effects estimation results, dependent variable: human adjustment-rate
Sample 1 Human, 29 Robots 5 Humans, 25 Robots 5 Humans, 5 Robots
Intercept −0.90∗∗ −0.40∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
xh 0.10∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.30∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
yh 0.20∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
zh −0.10∗∗ −0.70∗∗ −0.50∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R1 4.95∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.11) (0.03) (0.01)
˜φuh 0.80∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lˆ −0.68∗∗ −1.50∗∗ −0.42∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Lˆ∗IFE 0.49∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
Lˆ∗LTC −0.62∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.23∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
c2 0.89∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
c2∗IFE −0.23∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
c2∗LTC 0.20∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.06
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Crash 0.07∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
nobs 185,132 185,667 181,285
R2 0.26 0.20 0.19
χ2
(8) 65,464 57,422
Estimates (and standard errors) from random effects regressions of human traders’ adjustment rates ah on
the following explanatory variables: cash holdings xh , share holdings yh , wealth zh , weekly return R1,
truncated gradient ˜φuh , crash dummy Crash, enhanced interface dummy IFE, and low transactions cost
dummy LTC. The number of observations nobs differs slightly across treatments due to bankruptcies.
∗∗ Significant at 1%
Table 3 presents regression results with controls that include the human traders
level of cash, shares, wealth, return, and an indicator variable for crash period. The
dependent variable is the adjustment rate chosen by each human each week.
The coefficients reported for Lˆ and c2 refer the baseline treatment–standard trans-
action costs and no ability to view other traders. Consistent with the robot algorithm,
these reported coefficients indicate that humans do respond to their own losses by
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selling. The c2 coefficient is positive, suggesting that humans are net buyers as market
wide losses increase. (However, more detailed regression results, seen in the appendix,
indicate that, when personal losses are removed from the regression equation, humans
respond to market wide losses by selling.) The interaction terms indicate that human
traders respond more strongly to losses during low transaction cost treatments than in
the baseline, but that they respond less strongly to losses when allowed to view other
human traders. The Appendix also shows that alternative specifications of exponential
losses sharpen these results.
5 Discussion
Agent-human interactions in financial markets can have surprising effects. A caution-
ary example is the US stock market collapse of October 1987, which the official
Brady commission (e.g., Brady et al. 1988) attributed in no small part to auto-
mated agents executing sell orders for “portfolio insurance. “Automated agents today
play a larger role than ever, yet little is known about their impact on market per-
formance. For example, a week after the event, investigators of the startling and
mysterious downspike in US stock prices on May 6, 2010 began to focus on auto-
mated agents that interacted badly with “circuit-breakers” designed for humans (Wyatt
2010).
This paper takes some first, preliminary steps towards understanding the implica-
tions of agent-human interactions. We introduced human subjects as traders (or portfo-
lio managers) into the bubble-and-crash prone simulations of Friedman and Abraham
(2009), featuring agents (“robots”) that follow the payoff gradient in a financial market.
Notable findings include:
1. Humans adapt reasonably well to the simulated financial market. Overall, human
traders earn profits somewhat lower than do the robots but the humans actually
outperform the robots in the most challenging, crash-intensive, periods.
2. Human traders tend to destabilize the smaller (10 trader) markets, although less so
as they become more experienced. They do not seem to stabilize or to destabilize
the larger (30 trader) markets.
3. To a significant extent, human traders follow buying and selling strategies similar
to the robots’. Even though human subjects in our experiment are not told the robot
strategies, their purchases and sales respond systematically to the payoff gradient,
with the same sign as (and more than half of the magnitude of) the robots.
4. The simulation model seems to capture some aspects of how human traders react
to losses. Other things equal, humans in our experiment tend to purchase more
slowly and sell faster when they personally have recently experienced greater
losses. Their reaction to an index of perceived market-wide risk is less respon-
sive than to personal losses. However, it is still consistent with the simulation
model.
Are there more general lessons that can be learned from our exercise? Each period
of our simple market spans two simulated decades, so, even initially inexperienced
undergraduate traders can gain considerable expertise. By design, our markets are
far simpler than major modern financial markets. This simplicity allows us to make
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clear inferences, and tell us better what to look for in field markets. Our human trad-
ers showed that there is some degree of realism in the gradient trading algorithm,
and the response to losses, assumed in the simulation. (As noted in the introduc-
tion, it is hard to use field data to validate or falsify such individual-level assump-
tions.)
We believe that our results also shed some light on human behavior. It did
not take mob psychology—manias or panics—to create bubbles and crashes. It is
sufficient to have a positive feedback loop, as in the simulation, between recent
trends in asset returns, realized losses, and the risk premium. The current study also
showed that human traders, although not as quick or as profitable overall, were bet-
ter than the current generation of robots in adapting to the most crash-prone finan-
cial markets. The nature of those adaptations suggests that bubbles and crashes in
field markets are less likely after human traders have experienced severe turbu-
lence.
Our study opens new territory for exploration. For example, one can compare
the abilities of various simulation models (including the Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) switching models) to account for data generated by other models and by
humans.
In a different direction, one might examine existing field data (or even laboratory
data) for evidence of gradient-following behavior, or for evidence that sentiment or
risk premia respond to recent losses, or for a variety of other human trading strategies.
More broadly, we hope our study encourages a more active interplay between analysis
of field data, laboratory experiments with human subjects, and agent based simulation
models.
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6 Appendix A
The definitions of simulation parameters are collected in Table 4.
6.1 Wealth Comparison
In order to compare wealth between the two types, we calculate what robot wealth
would be under the exact conditions humans face. Therefore, we adjust the robot vari-
able in three ways. First, we set their initial endowment equal to the human endowment.
Second, we translate their gradient into one of the seven adjustment rates as explained
in the main text. Third, we impute transaction cost based on the translated gradient.
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Table 4 Parameter definitions Parameter Definition
R0 Risk-free rate
d R Discount rate
gs Growth-rate of economy
σ Variance of idiosyncratic shock
τ Persistence of idiosyncratic shock
η Memory rate
β Sensitivity to risk
d Price pressure sensitivity
λ Exponential rate of recruiting from z-pool
by a successful manager
d Portion of holdings to withdraw
rate Controlling the overall recruiting rate
After making those adjustments we then calculate step by step how wealth for each
robot changes overtime until the period ends.
6.2 Integrating Robots & Humans
The decision variables of humans and robots have different scaling properties. The
robot allocation choice, ui , is a number between zero and four while the human’s allo-
cation variables, cash and shares, are in the hundreds. The scale is different because it is
easier for humans to understand holding dollars and shares in the hundreds rather than
in decimals. However, since humans’ decisions, alongside robots’ decisions, affect
the environment, price, their allocation choice and portfolio size variables, uh and
zh , need to be consistent with robot decision variables. Therefore, we translate the
humans’ shares into an appropriate uh , which equals one minus the ratio of their cash
to wealth,






where h refers to a specific human. Under this specification, if cash holdings equals
zero then uh equals 1, meaning they are fully invested in the risky asset, while if cash
holdings is negative then uh > 1 meaning they are borrowing the safe asset and if
cash holdings is positive then uh < 1 meaning they are investing a portion in the safe
and risky asset.
The human’s portfolio size, zh , does not need to be scaled; it changes similar to how
the robot’s portfolio size, zi , changes, based on the return, inflow rate, and outflow
rate.3 However, there are two subtleties that differentiate the portfolio size z of the
3 See Friedman and Abraham (2009) for an explanation of the inflow and outflow rate.
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human and robot trader. First, all humans receive an initial zh equal to 1. The robots
receive their initial risk allocation, ui , and portfolio size, zi , randomly via a uniform
distribution.4 All humans receive the same endowment in order to avoid giving any
one an advantage or disadvantage. Second, robots receive an idiosyncratic shock and
humans do not. Also, humans pay transaction costs unlike robots, who implicitly face
quadratic adjustment costs. These implicit quadratic adjustment costs are the under-
lying reason why robots follow a gradient. Humans incur quadratic transaction costs
because we want to analyze their behavior under the same assumed conditions. Human
transaction costs are,
th = c(adjustment-rateh)2, c = constant, (8)
where given that the constant, c, is set to 1, trading at a fast rate incurs a transaction
cost of 25%, a medium rate incurs a cost of 6.25%, and a slow rate incurs a cost of
1.6%. In the low transaction cost treatment, the constant c is reduced 50% to 0.5.
Another integration issue involves buying and selling. The buttons −3,−2,−1, 0,
1, 2, 3 shown on the interface were chosen for ease of viewing. The actual rates are
0.125 for a slow rate, 0.25 for a medium rate, and 0.5 for a fast rate. These rates were
chosen based on the standard deviation of the robot’s chosen gradient, 0.125, in an all
robot simulation using a baseline configuration.
6.3 Frequency of Adjustment-Rates During Crashes
Figure 13 shows that humans sell more at the beginning of a crash and buy towards
the end of crash. Humans in the lower transaction cost treatment also use the faster
rate more frequently than humans in the standard transaction cost treatment.
We also run each regression with an intercept term. The intercept estimate is sta-
tistically different from zero for the humans (Table 5).
6.4 Human and Robot Loss Regressions
Table 5 and 6 rerun the loss regression using human and robot data. In each regression,
we use the same explanatory variables.
6.5 Losses Regression Using Different Half Lives
In order to determine how much weight humans put on their current and past losses
we run the same regression as in Table 3 using different values of η to calculate Lˆ .
Investors seem to judge managers by the overall historical track record, with greater
emphasis on more recent results. The natural formalization is an exponential average,
4 The distribution is supported on a [u;z] rectangle set via sliders; the default is [0.2; 1.4] × [0.4; 1.6].
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Fig. 13 Frequency of adjustment rates before crash and toward the end of crash over different treatments
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Table 5 Random effects estimation results, dependent variable: human adjustment-rate
Variable 1 Human, 29 Robots 5 Humans, 25 Robots 5 Humans, 5 Robots
Intercept −0.03∗∗ (0.02) 0.10∗∗ (0.01) 0.40∗∗ (0.03)
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
uh 0.09∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.97∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
c2 ∗ uh −0.28∗∗ −0.20∗∗ 0.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
R1 2.90∗∗ 0.88∗∗ 1.56∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Lˆ −0.89∗∗ −1.23∗∗ −0.25∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)∗∗
Lˆ∗IFE 0.22∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.42∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
Lˆ∗LTC −0.76∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.15∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01)∗∗
c2 0.10∗∗ −0.08∗∗ 0.21
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
c2∗IFE −0.18∗∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
c2∗LTC 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Crash 0.61∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
Nobs 185,132 185,667 181,285
R2 0.07 0.01 0.08
χ2
(8) 22,331 7,253 21,933
Estimates are shown with their standard errors in the parenthesis from a regression where the dependent
variable is the adjustment-rate, ah , of human h at time t. uh refers to the level of risk holding, R1 is the
weekly return. c2 ∗ uh is an interaction term of c2 times uh and Crash is an indicator variable that assigns
a 1 to the time period of a crash and 0 otherwise. IFE is an indicator variable that equals one for sessions
where human can see other traders and 0 otherwise and LTC is an indicator variable that equals one for ses-
sions with low transaction costs and 0 otherwise. Observations between population treatments are slightly
different depending on the number of bankruptcies. ∗∗ Significant at 1%. Variables are as in Table 3
defined recursively from its previous value Lˆi (t − h) as follows
Lˆi (t) = e−ηh Lˆi (t − h) + (1 − e−ηh)Li (t). (9)
We run several regressions using different η values to determine how far back
human traders remember their losses. We run the following regressions by population
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Table 6 Random effects estimation results, dependent variable: robot adjustment-rate
Variable 1 Human, 29 Robots 5 Humans, 25 Robots 5 Humans, 5 Robots
Intercept 0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ui 0.90∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 1.30∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
c2 ∗ ui −0.72∗∗ −0.60∗∗ −0.73∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R1 0.49∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Lˆ −1.68∗∗ −1.67∗∗ −0.12∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01)
Lˆ∗IFE 0.29∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Lˆ∗LTC −0.12∗∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.04∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
c2 0.39∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
c2∗IFE −0.01∗∗ −0.01 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
c2∗LTC 0.01∗∗ −0.02 0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Crash −0.07∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.51∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Nobs 5,418,360 934,200 186,840
R2 0.26 0.25 0.16
χ2
(8) 301,284 286,344 35,371
Estimates are shown with their standard errors in the parenthesis from a regression where the dependent
variable is the adjustment-rate, ai , of robot i at time t. ui refers to the level of risk holding, R1 is the weekly
return. c2 ∗ ui is an interaction term of c2 times ui and Crash is an indicator variable that assigns a 1 to the
time period of a crash and 0 otherwise. IFE is an indicator variable that equals one for sessions where human
can see other traders and 0 otherwise and LTC is an indicator variable that equals one for sessions with
low transaction costs and 0 otherwise. Observations between population treatments are slightly different
depending on the number of bankruptcies. ∗∗ Significant at 1%. Variables are as in Table 3
treatment because we assume that different population treatments may affect how
humans remember their realized losses.
Tables 7, 8, and 9 report regression results using standardized coefficients in order
to compare estimates across different values of η. Results from Tables 7 and 8 indi-
cate a value of η between 0.30 and 1.30 characterizes human memory the best for the
(1 Human, 29 Robots) and (5 Humans, 25 Robots) treatments. These regressions report
the greatest magnitude of coefficients and the highest values of χ2(8). This provides
123
Human and Artificial Agents in a Crash-Prone Financial Market 223
Table 7 1 Human, 29 robots: random effects using different etas
Variable η = 3 η = 1.3 η = 0.7 η = .3 η = .1
ˆLh,t −0.09∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.11∗∗
(0.016) (0.02) (0.028) (0.036) (0.08)
ˆLh,t _h5_r25 0.8∗∗ 5.9∗∗ 13.5∗∗ 18.4∗∗ 18.0∗∗
(0.021) (0.03) (0.037) 1 (0.09) (0.10)
ˆLh,t _h1_r29 0.04∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.16∗
(0.004) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.12)
χ2
(8) 78450.58 78935.52 79106.36 80237.31 78406.74
∗∗ Significant at 1%; standardized coefficients
Table 8 5 Humans, 25 robots: random effects using different etas
Variable η = 3 η = 1.3 η = 0.7 η = .3 η = .1
ˆLh,t −0.25∗∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.21∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.027) (0.034) (0.079)
ˆLh,t _h5_r25 0.16∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.019) (0.026) (0.037) (0.074) (0.094)
ˆLh,t _h1_r29 −0.01∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.015) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026) (0.089)
χ2
(8) 62980.82 64520.72 65464.79 64898.95 62687.09
∗∗ Significant at 1%; standardized coefficients
Table 9 5 Humans, 5 robots: random effects using different etas
Variable η = 3 η = 1.3 η = 0.7 η = 0.3 η = 0.1
ˆLh,t −0.16∗∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.27∗∗
(0.036) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
ˆLh,t _h5_r25 0.12∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.01) (0.018) (0.02)
ˆLh,t _h1_r29 −0.05∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.08∗∗ 0.02∗∗ −0.08∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.01) (0.009) (0.027)
χ2
(8) 54159.50 55693.53 57422.40 63791.14 67095.58
∗∗ Significant at 1%; standardized coefficients
some support for using a value of η equal to 0.70 (or about a 1 year half life) in the
simulation’s baseline configuration. However, Table 9 indicates the lowest η, 0.1, is
the correct memory parameter to characterize human memory in the hard hit, high
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Fig. 14 Individual human exponential average of losses vs. returns. Each number corresponds to a human
trader
crash (5 Humans, 5 Robots) treatment. Humans remember the harder hit crashes bet-
ter. For example, people remember the Great Depression better than the recession that
occurred in 1948.
For a robustness check we run the loss regression by individual and look for esti-
mates that are outliers. Figure 14 shows individual estimates of Lˆh and return by
population treatment. We then took out the humans that were noted as outliers and ran
all regressions again. Results did not change and thus passed our robustness check.
7 Appendix B: Instructions for Financial Market Experiments
Introduction
You will be a trader in a stock market where you can buy and sell shares of a single
stock. The market runs for 12 trading periods. These instructions explain how you
trade shares and how you make profits.
All quotes and profits during the experiment will be in lab dollars. At the end of the
last trading period, your total profit will be converted into US dollars at a conversion
rate written on the board, and paid to you in cash.
Time
Each trading period consists of 20 “years,” and there are 52 “weeks” in each year.
A week only takes a second or two of real time in this experiment, so a year goes by
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pretty quickly! Each week, your computer screen updates your trades and wealth, and
the time remaining in that trading period.
At the end of each trading period, your computer screen reports your profit that
period, and the cumulative profit you have earned so far. After the last trading period,
it shows your total profit in lab dollars.
Profits and Wealth
Your profit each period is your final wealth less a fixed fee. The fee is written on the
board.
Before a trading period begins you will receive $500 in cash and 75 shares of stock.
Your wealth at any point during the trading period equals your cash plus the amount
of shares owned times the current share price. Before trading begins:
Wealthinitial=$500+75 shares * priceinitial
At the end of the trading period:
Profit=Wealthfinal−Fee=Cashfinal+Sharesfinal * pricefinal−Fee
Your computer screen helps you keep track of your wealth. The display is similar
to this: Your stock position is the number of shares times the share price.
How Wealth Changes
Even when you don’t trade, your wealth changes due to:
1. Interest: If you hold a positive amount of cash your cash savings will increase with
each week. During the trading period your cash grows at 3% per year. However,
if you borrow cash, which is the same as having negative cash, your cash position
will decrease with every week or worsens at 3% per year.
2. Stock Dividends: If you own shares, you may receive additional shares each week
at a rate announced at the beginning of each trading period. (Sometimes the rate is
zero, and occasionally it is negative.) For example, if the dividend rate is 2%, then
the number of shares you hold increases 2% each year.
3. Share Price: If you own shares, then your wealth will change with the current share
price. As explained below, the price of a share of stock changes every week.
EXAMPLE. Suppose you have $250 in cash, 50 shares of stock, the interest rate is
3%, the dividend rate is 2%, and the current share price is $10. Your wealth is $250
+ 50 * $10 = $750. Suppose that a “year” later the share price is $15 and you did not
buy or sell any stock in the meantime. Then your wealth becomes:
$250 * (1 + 0.03) + 50 * (1 + 0.02) * $15 = $1022.
Share Price
The share price is determined by the:
1. Dividend rate: The higher the growth-rate the higher the share price.
2. Interest rate: The higher the interest-rate the lower the share price.
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3. Buying and Selling Pressure: No one trader has much impact on the share-price,
but if many traders are selling at the same time they will tend to temporarily drive
down the share price. Likewise, the share price will tend to rise when lots of traders
are buying at the same time.
Although the dividend rate and the interest rate remain constant during a trading period,
the share price will change every week. Below is an example of a price plot which
you will see on your computer screen.
Buying and Selling
Below is an image of how you will buy and sell. When you click a button you are
buying or selling shares at a specific rate. Once you click a button (just once will do)
your shares will change at that rate each week until you click another button.
A negative number indicates a sell and a positive number indicates a buy. Zero
indicates you are neither buying nor selling. The larger the number the faster the rate
you are buying or selling. Therefore, if you click “3” then you will buy at the fastest
rate possible and if you click “1” you will buy at the slow rate. To stop buying or
selling you must click “0”. In order for you to remember whether you are buying or
selling and at which rate you are buying or selling, a message box appears underneath
the trading buttons.
Trading Limits
Short selling is not allowed in this game. If your stock position is zero, a message
will appear on your screen saying that you have zero stock, and the computer will not
allow you to sell stock. Margin buying is allowed up to a limit that depends on your
current wealth. That is, up to the limit shown on your screen, you can buy stock even
when your cash position is zero or negative. If you borrow and the value of your stock
position falls too much, then your wealth will hit zero. When that happens, you are
bankrupt and can’t trade any more for the rest of that trading period.
Transaction Costs
When you click a button to buy or sell stock you incur transaction costs, which come
out of your cash position. These costs are much higher at the highest buying and selling
rates.
You can keep track using two charts which are located underneath the buy and sell
buttons. The return chart shows how fast your wealth is growing without transaction
cost. The transaction costs chart shows how fast the transactions costs are depleting
your wealth. The difference between the return and transaction costs is the rate at
which your wealth actually changes.
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Fig. 15 Graphics window
Fig. 16 Density of managers window
Automated Agents
Before a trading period begins, the experimenter will announce whether you are trad-
ing solely with other human participants or whether you are trading with other humans
as well as automated agents. Automated agents trade according to a fixed formula.
Automated agents can also influence buying and selling pressure that changes the
share price.
(For Sessions Where Human Subjects Use the Graphic Windows).
Graphics Window
The graphics window displays automated agents as small triangles, other human trad-
ers as round dots, and you as a dot with a specified color. The horizontal axis represents
the ratio of stock position to wealth. For example, if you buy more shares then your dot
will move to the right. The vertical axis represents the trader’s wealth. If your wealth
is increasing then your dot will move upward. Zero is indicated by the horizontal
magenta strip in the center of the graphics window. The large white circle represents
the average share holdings and wealth of all traders (Fig. 15).
Density of Managers
The Density of Managers chart is a histogram of the horizontal position of all trad-
ers, automated and human. A large clump of wealthy traders in the graphics window
corresponds to a high point in this chart (Fig. 16).
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Fig. 17 Landscape window
Landscape Plot
The Landscape chart shows the return rate (profit before transactions costs) each week
for traders at every horizontal position (stock position relative to wealth). The graphics
window shows where return is positive (green), negative (red), or very close to zero
(yellow), but provides less detail than the Landscape chart (Fig. 17).
Summary
1. To earn as much money as possible during this experiment, try to accumulate as
much wealth as you can by the end of each trading period.
2. At any time, your wealth is your cash position plus the value of your stock position.
That value is the number of shares times the stock price.
3. You begin each trading period with an initial cash and stock position.
4. To purchase or sell stock at a specific rate, you click a button once. To change the
rate, or to stop trading, you must click another button.
5. Every time you buy or sell you incur a transaction cost which depletes your wealth.
You can have a negative cash position (borrowing at a specified interest rate) but
not a negative share position (no short selling allowed).
6. Each trading period lasts a certain amount of real time (e.g., 10 min) and time
advances on a weekly basis. Therefore, each trading period begins at week 0 and
ends on week 1040. There will be several trading periods in each experiment.
FAQs
Q1. What does the return mean?
A1. Return-rate is the rate in which you are making or losing money. So if your
wealth is $1000 and your return rate is 10% then over one year or 52 weeks your
wealth would have increased by $1000 * 10% or $100.
Q2. What does the transaction cost mean?
A2. It means you are paying to make a sell or trade. When you select a rate to buy
or sell you will see a return chart and transaction cost chart. If the transaction cost
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chart is above the return chart that means you are paying more in transaction costs
than you are making in the stock market and thus your wealth is actually decreasing.
Q3. Will I really be paid cash at the end of the experiment?
A3. Yes. The cash payments are funded by the National Science Foundation and
other research organizations. These instructions are all on the level. If we do any-
thing deceptive, or don’t pay you cash as described, then you can complain to the
campus Institutional Review Board and we will be in serious trouble. Our interest
is in seeing how people make decisions in market situations.
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